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ABSTRACT
The present essay examines the case for social experiments in evaluating active labor
market policy. First, basic advantages and disadvantages of controlled experimentation
are assessed. Second, the reasons why social experimentation may turn out to be
important in shaping new form of work are discussed.
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1. Introduction
The impressive pace of institutional and technological change that took place in the last century
has to some extent reinforced what the Nobel laureate in physics Nils Bohr once said: "Prediction
is very dicult, especially if it's about the future". The present essay, rather than trying to forecast
general and complex trends concerning labor characteristics, concentrates on the future of labor
market policy. More specically, it examines the case for social experiments in evaluating active
labor market policies. Even if the topic might seem peripheral to the present cluster (The Future
of Work), in the last section of the essay we shall try to argue that initiatives likewise the New
Work Project directed by Frithjof Bergmann, especially if nanced with public money, may be
envisaged as social experiments and could be evaluated using randomization.
For the layperson an experiment is any major deviation from past policy or practices. However,
the scientic notion of experiment is much narrower. In particular, it requires that the researcher
controls both the variable under investigation and the environment in which this variable is ob-
served. Of course, accurate measures of the eect require reliable basis of comparison and outside
the laboratory this is far for being trivial.
A natural basis of comparison is the state of the variable under investigation before the exper-
iment takes place. However, the so-called before-and-after comparison is not always accurate. The
impact of minimum wages on employment, for example, is not detectable by simply measuring the
change in employment levels occurred in a given area after that a raise of minimum wages has taken
place. In fact, taken for granted that many additional time-variant factors inuence employment,
it would be inappropriate to attribute the whole change detected to a single policy measure. To
repeat, the basic problem is to establish a credible basis of comparison, i.e. what one may call the
control group has to be as similar as possible to the treatment one. In the minimum wage example
a reasonable procedure would be to confront the change occurred in an area where minimum wages
have been raised with changes occurred in the same period in a very similar area where minimum
wages level has remained constant.
Fisher (1929) has probably been the rst to argue that the only satisfactory method of achieving
reliable groups is to assign subjects (in the above example geographical areas) to the treatment
group at random. This kind of procedure is often referred as a randomized experiment.
Running experiments happens to be much easier for natural scientists than social ones. One
may even argue this is one of the major epistemological dierences between the natural and social
sciences. Nevertheless, contrary to the above position social experimentation is feasible and dates
back more than thirty years. Greenberg and Shroder (1991) identify more than 90 eld trials in
social science research areas including social insurance, labor supply, worker training, and housing
subsidies. In the present essay we examine the rationale for eld experimentation in evaluating
active labor market policies (ALMP).
Active labor market policies dier from others policies aecting the labor market in two basic{ 3 {
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ways: rst, they are targeted towards the unemployed or towards individuals with low skills or
little work experience. Second, they are aimed at promoting employment or wage growth among
disadvantaged groups, rather than transferring income (e.g. unemployment benets).
As showed in Figure 1 expenditure for ALMP is not negligible in many European countries,
and is higher than in the US. Ironically, much of what we know about the eects of such policies
and many of the methodological developments used to evaluate them come form US based studies.
This is indeed one of the reasons why a more careful and detailed assessment by European policy
makers is needed. Interestingly enough, Kluve (2006) has found in his recent survey that rather than
country specic factors such as labor market institutions, it is almost exclusively the program type
that matters for program eectiveness. In what follows, ve broad set of policies are consideres as
ALMP:2 (i) classroom training consisting of education to remedy lack in general or vocational skills;
(ii) subsidized employment, which includes both public service employment and wage supplement
to private rms for hiring new workers; (iii) subsidies to workers and private rms for the provision
of on-the-job training; (iv) training on job searching and how to obtain a job; (v) non-monetary
subsidies to job search. Incidentally, New Work initiative may be envisaged as a mix of the above
measures.
2This classication borrows from Heckman et al. (1999).{ 4 {
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 points out the basic advantages of
controlled experimentation over other methods. Section 3 presents some of its main limitations
and the criticisms leveled in recent years. Finally, section 4 tries to pinpoint some of the reasons
why social experimentation may be relevant for the future of work.
2. Causal Inference and Randomization
Politicians may be skeptical of a research methods involving experimentation with human
objets. It is therefore important to be very clear in highlighting strengths and limitation of this
research tool. The basic advantage of experimental methods over other non-experimental ones is
that they allow to measure the causal eect of a given policy with high reliability. To x ideas, let
use use the notion of potential outcomes, introduced by Rubin (1974). Suppose we are interested
in measuring the impact of a given training program on individual wages. Let us dene Y T
i as the
wage of individual i if she enrolled in the training program under study and Y C
i as the wage of
the same individual in case she did not. Let us also assume that we are interested in Y T
i   Y C
i ,
which is the eect of the training program on individual i. Of course, it is not possible to observe
both outcomes for the same individual. This problem, sometimes called the fundamental problem
of causality, makes explicit the impossibility of estimating individual treatment eects. However,
we can hope to learn something about the problem under scrutiny estimating the expected average
eect that training program have on a given population of workers:
E[Y T
i   Y C
i ]: (1)
Note that we do not assume that the eect is the same across workers, rather we aim at calculating
an average allowing for heterogeneity. Let us imagine we have access to data on a large number
of workers of a given population, and some of them are actually enrolled in a training program
(Gi = 1) and some did not (Gi = 0). A possible approach is calculating wage averages of both
groups and computing the dierence between the two. In large sample this will converge to:
D = E[Y T
i jGi = 1]   E[Y C
i jGi = 0]:
If one adds and subtracts E[Y C
i jGi = 1], i.e. the expected wage of an individual actually enrolled
in the program had she not enrolled (a quantity not observable, but logically well dened), one
obtains:
D = E[Y T
i   Y C
i jGi = 1] + E[Y C
i jGi = 1]   E[Y C
i jGi = 0]:
The rst term E[Y T
i   Y C
i jGi = 1] is the so called average treatment eect on the treated. In our
case, is the average eect of the programs on those who participated. The second term E[Y C
i jGi =
1]   E[Y C
i jGi = 0] capture the dierence in terms of expected wages between the two groups and
is commonly dubbed the selection bias. There are good reasons to believe that the latter term is
dierent form zero. For example, those who enroll in training programs may be more motivated
and therefore more productive than those who did not enrol. Alternatively, those who participate{ 5 {
may be the most needy and therefore less skilled. Both factors obviously have an impact on wage.
The general point is that simply calculating the average of groups and computing the dierence
may generate biased estimates, given that there might be systematic dierence between individuals
who participate in training programs and those who do not. Moreover, given that E[Y C
i jGi = 1] is
not observable, it is very hard to assess the magnitude and even the sign of the bias.
Most non-experimental methods try to correct for the above bias or to identify situations
where it does not exist. In both cases it is necessary to rest on untestable assumption about either
individual unobservables or the decision to participate in a program. On the other hand, if we
could assign randomly part of the population to training program, treatment and control groups
would dier in expectation only through their exposure to the treatment. This implies that the
selection bias, E[Y C
i jGi = 1]   E[Y C
i jGi = 0], would be equal to zero. Moreover, if the potential
outcomes of an individual are unrelated to the treatment status of any other individual, we have
that:
E[Y T
i jGi = 1]   E[Y C
i jGi = 0] = E[Y T
i   Y C
i jGi = 1] = E[Y T
i   Y C
i ];
which is exactly what we wanted to estimate in equation 1. Therefore, when a randomized evalua-
tion is implemented it provides an unbiased estimate of the impact of a given policy on the sample
under study.
To conclude this section, it is worth mentioning a second set of "less technical" and to a
certain extent more controversial advantages of experiments over more traditional methods.3 First,
in many cases experiments allow to measure the eect of policies that have not previously been
implemented. This is obviously impossible for empirical studies who have to rely on traditional
sources of data. Second, the simplicity of experiments oers clear advantages in making results
convincing for politicians and public opinion in general. In fact, contrary to most claims derived
from nonexperimental investigations, experiments permit to drive analytical ndings that are not
subject to the complicated qualications of most standard econometric methods.
3. Randomization and Its Discontents
Notwithstanding the advantages discussed in the previous section, randomized eld trials face
numerous problems. A preliminary aspect concerns the ethical issues raised by experimentation
with human beings. In fact, random assignment is often considered as an unfair way to ration
public resources. Why, for example, individuals who are eligible for a training program should not
participate because of a lottery? However, similar ethical concerns are also present in studies of
new medicines and medical procedures, where stakes for participants are often much grater than
in social experiments. Still such trials are in many cases required to prove ecacy of new medical
treatments. Moreover, good experimental design can reduce ethical objection: rst, randomization
3See for example the dierent views expressed by Burtless (1995) and Heckman and Smith (1995).{ 6 {
may be undertaken only among those subjects who are willing to participate to a given program.
In this way one wold avoid forced compliance. Second, in certain circumstances it is possible to
compensate individuals who are oered potentially harmful treatments or denied benecial services.
More generally, the basic and more convincing ethical argument in favor of experimentation is that it
is better to inict possible harm to a limited number of individuals through a small scale experiment
rather than on a much larger scale as a result of unsound public policy.
The most popular critic to experiments is that they do not reect the general equilibrium eect
of a particular policy. The basic intuition here is that small scale random evaluations compare the
dierence between treatment and control groups in a given region without assessing the eect that a
policy may have on other subjects and/or other geographical areas. For example, in the evaluation
of a training programs that randomly subsidize a few workers, their advantages may be magnied
by the fact that few other people in the same local market receive additional training. Moreover,
little is known on how the experiments itself aects other important aspects of the local economy
like the price of training courses, workers job search activity, and rms decision to implement
training programs.
It is certainly true that randomized experiments are able to measure only partial equilibrium
responses to policy changes. Nevertheless, sometimes this does not seem a real problem, given that
the parameter of interest is exactly the partial eect. For example, if a small scale program whose
targets are disadvantaged workers is found to have an impact on their labor market outcomes and
from a policy perspective we are interested in the welfare of those particular workers, the general
equilibrium eects are probably small and irrelevant. Moreover, one may argue that even if the
objective is general equilibrium eect, knowing the partial equilibrium one is better than nothing.
More generally, researchers may try to overcome the problem in a number of ways: rst, one wants
to be extremely clear on the population of interest; second, if the possible treats posed by non
measurable general equilibrium eects are explicitly addressed, they can be tested using additional
control groups.
A last problem we want to explicitly address is the ability of randomized experiments to capture
structural parameters. This is a subtle but important point: experiments allow to estimate the
overall impact of a particular policy, such as a subsidized training program, on an outcome, such
as worker wages or satisfaction, allowing other inputs to change in response to the program. This
might well dier from the impact of a training program on wages keeping everything else constant.
To see the dierence between the two eects, let us assume that it exists a function Y = f(I),
where Y is the outcome of interest and I is a vector of inputs, one of which, let us call it p, is a
given policy. Of course p may also have an impact also on other inputs. The relation between Y
and I is structural in the sense that it holds regardless of the actions of individuals or institutions
aected by the policy changes.
Consider now an exogenous change in the policy p. One interesting estimate is how a variation
in p aects Y when all other input are held constant. This is the partial derivative of Y with{ 7 {
respect to p. Another interesting estimate is the total derivative of Y with respect to p, which
includes changes in Y caused by variation in the other elements of I as a result of changes in p.
Both derivatives may be interesting for policymakers. The total derivative tells us what happens
to outcomes after an input is exogenously provided and agents react. In some sense this is the true
impact of the policy. Nevertheless, it may not provide a reliable measure of overall welfare eects.
Consider for example a policy of providing subsidies to job search activity. Workers may respond
to the policy by decreasing their search eort in favor of some leisure activity. The total derivative
of wage or other occupational outcomes will not capture the welfare increases due to more leisure.
On the other hand, partial derivative may provide an appropriate guide to the welfare impact of
the policy.
To be sure, results from experiments provide reduced form estimates of the impacts of a given
policy and therefore what one ultimately obtains are total derivatives. Partial derivatives can only
be inferred if one is able to specify a valid model that links inputs to the outcomes of interest and
collects data on these intermediate inputs. This underscores that experiments are not substitutes
for economic models. Rather, to estimate welfare impact of a policy, randomization needs to be
combined with theory.
4. Discussion
To which extent the above assessment of social experimentation is relevant for the Future of
Work? Does the research tool assessed in this essay contribute to predict which forms of work would
become determining in the next decades? These are open questions and this section is meant to
argue that social experimentation might well be important in shaping new forms of work.
Since Adam Smith, economists acknowledge that many of the improvements in the productive
power of labor have been the eects of the division of labor. At the same time some of its drawbacks
have also been underscored. In particular, the social and moral consequences of a system that if
pushed too far may deprive the workman of his independence and weaken intellectual skills have
been studied. To be sure, technological and institutional change have often interacted with work-
force specialization and standardization in unpredictable ways changing the basic characteristics
of gainful employment. In the introduction we acknowledged that it is very dicult to foreseen
which forms of work will prevail in the balancing between the benets of the division of labor and
its harmful consequences. We then concentrated on a research tool that is able to measure the
impact of active labor market programs on dierent kinds of labor market outcomes. Sharp and
well functioning policies might well shape the future of labor.
New Work organization could be a good example here. Founded in the early 80s also as a con-
sequence to the massive layos of General Motors workers, it was originally intended to give people
practical guidance in exploring new employment opportunities. Nowadays New Work has come to
embrace a more ambitious program dedicated to reformulating the way people conceive their work{ 8 {
activity. Even if it is an open question if such programs are suitable for randomization, in some
broad sense New Work may be consider a sort of social experiment. Together with detailed accounts
on how New Work initiatives have so far worked (i.e. case studies), randomization over distinct
locations may represent an important source of information on the impact of New Work program.
Moreover, for the reasons presented in Section 2, it could facilitate public opinion mobilization and
politicians' awareness. An important issue concerns the selection of a few outcome variables. In
other words it is important to be clear on which dimensions one expects New Work oces do have
an impact. To the best of my knowledge, given the objectives of the initiative, a meaningful option,
together with standard labor market outcomes, is collecting an array of indicators on individuals
job satisfaction.
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